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7KHUHJXODWLRQRIKHDOWKFDUHLQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ0HPEHU6WDWHV¶GLVFUHWLRQRUD
widening of EU law?: Femarbel and Ottica New Line 
Case C-57/12 Fédération des maisons de repos privées de Belgique (Femarbel) ASBL v. 
Commission communautaire commune de Bruxelles-Capitale, Judgment of the Court of 
Justice (First Chamber) of 11 July 2013, nyr; Case C-539/11 Ottica New Line di Accardi 
Vincenzo v. Commune di Campobello di Mazara, Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 
26 September 2013, nyr.  
 
1. Introduction 
The Court of Justice (ECJ) has been increasingly active in issuing judgments in the field of 
services in recent years. Both economic and legal factors have contributed to the deluge of 
case law1 emanating from the ECJ DQGLWVHHPVFOHDUWKDWVHUYLFHVKDYHEHFRPH³WKHGULYLQJ
IRUFHRIWKH(8HFRQRP\´2. In the context of healthcare, the ECJ¶VMXULVSUXGHQFHKDVUHFHQWO\
been clarified and codified in Directive 2011/24/EU on SDWLHQWV¶ ULJKWV LQ FURVV-border 
healthcare µ3DWLHQWV¶0RELOLW\'LUHFWLYH¶.3 It complements Directive 2006/123 on services 
LQWKHLQWHUQDOPDUNHWµWKH6HUYLFHV'LUHFWLYH¶4 in the field of cross-border healthcare as the 
latter expressly excludes healthcare and certain social services from its scope. Two judgments 
recently issued by the ECJ make interesting reading in this regard. While the facts of Case C-
57/12 Femarbel and Case C-539/11 Ottica do not bear much resemblance to each other, the 
judgments illustrate that the definition of what falls under the umbrella of healthcare services 
is not always obvious. Moreover, the cases provide a timely example of attempts by 
commercial interest groups to use EU law to open up domestic healthcare markets to private, 
commercial service providers. As such, the judgments in the cases which were decided in 
2013 have the potential to provide clarity on the scope of the Services Directive and Member 
6WDWHV¶GLVFUHWLRQLQUHJXODWLQJKHDOWKFDUHSURYLVLRQLQWKHLUWHUULWRU\ Finally, the judgments 
provide yet another e[DPSOHRI WKH(&-¶VZLOOLQJQHVV WRDGMXGLFDWH LQFDVHVZKLFKFRQFHUQ
wholly internal situations. It is therefore timely to consider both cases in one case note.  
 
2. Factual and legal background 
The legal questions raised in both cases concern the scope of certain provisions of EU law: 
article 49 TFEU on the freedom of establishment; and, article 2 of the Services Directive. 
Article 2 lists activities which are not caught by the Directive including healthcare services 
whether or not they are provided via healthcare facilities (article 2(2)(f)) and certain social 
                                                            
1 6HH9+DW]RSRXORV³7KH&RXUW¶V$SSURDFKWR6HUYLFHV± 201)URP&DVH/DZWR&DVH/RDG"´ 50 
CML Rev. (2013), 459-501. 
2 Ibid at 459. 
3 Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on the application of patients' rights in 
cross-border healthcare OJ [2011] L88/45. )RUDQRYHUYLHZVHH6*UHHUDQG76RNRO³Rules for Rights: 
European Law, Health Care and Social CitizenVKLS´ (2014) 20 European Law Journal 66-87. 
4 European Parliament and Council Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market, O.J. 2006, L 
376/36.  
2 
 
services (article 2(2)(j)). Article 56 TFEU on the freedom to provide services is also raised in 
Ottica by the national court, however it is not considered by the Advocate General or by the 
ECJ and it is therefore not discussed in this case note. While the facts of Ottica and Femarbel 
do not contain many similarities, both cases centre on the compatibility of a national law 
which seeks to regulate the provision of healthcare services with relevant provisions of EU 
law.  
In Ottica, 2WWLFD1HZ/LQHGL$FFDUGL9LQFHQ]Rµ2WWLFD1HZ/LQH¶ ± DQRSWLFLDQ¶Vpractice 
± objected to a decision taken by the Commune di Campobello di Mazara in Sicily on 18 
December 2009 which permitted a rival optician Fotottica Media Visione di Luppino Natale 
)DEUL]LRH& VQF µ)RWRWWLFD¶ WRHVWDEOLVKDQRSWLFLDQ¶V VKRS LQ its territory in breach of 
Regional Law No 12/2004. Article 1(1) of Regional Law No 12/2004 required local 
authorities to take account of 
[T]he ratiRRILQKDELWDQWVWRRSWLFLDQV¶VKRSVLQRUGHUWRVHFXUHDUDWLRQDOGLVWULEXWLRQRI
supply throughout the territory. That ratio shall be established on the basis of one 
RSWLFLDQ¶VVKRSSHUUHVLGHQWV7KHGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQRQHRSWLFLDQ¶VVKRSDQGanother 
may be no less than 300 metres. 
2WWLFD 1HZ /LQH FRQWHVWHG WKH &RPPXQH¶V GHFLVLRQ EHIRUH WKH 7ULEXQDOH $PPLQLVWUDWLYH
Regionale per la Sicilia. In a decision issued on 18 March 2010 the Tribunale found against 
Ottica New Line reasoning that Article 1(1) could not apply because it breached the relevant 
provisions of EU Law which guarantee the right to freedom of establishment and the freedom 
to provide services. On appeal, the Consiglio di giustizia amministrativa per la Regione 
siciliana decided to stay proceedings in order to refer three questions for a preliminary ruling 
to the ECJ. In particular, the national court was uncertain as to whether the principles 
established in the ECJ¶V-RLQHG&DVHVBlanco Pérez and Chao Gómez5 could be transposed to 
the present case. These cases concerned a Spanish law regulating the establishment of new 
pharmacies through criteria such as population density and geographical distribution. The 
Court in Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez accepted that such criteria could justify a restriction 
on the freedom of establishment if they were necessary to improve the reliability and the 
quality of the provision of medicinal products to the public. 
The referring court in Ottica thus questioned, first, whether the national law at issue which 
breaches EU law by restricting the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services could be justified by an overriding reason relating to the public interest, in this case 
the need to protect public health. Should the ECJ answer the first question in the affirmative 
then the referring court in its second and third questions sought guidance on whether the 
restrictions in the Regional Law were appropriate and proportionate.  
In Femarbel, the Fédération des maisons de repos privéeV GH%HOJLTXH µ)HPDUEHO¶ RQ
February 2010 sought the annulment EHIRUHWKH&RQVHLOG¶État of a 2009 decision issued by 
the Commission communautaire commune de Bruxelles-Capitale µ&2&20¶ ZKLFK ODLG
down certain standards for the regulation of care centres for elderly persons. Under articles 
                                                            
5 Joined Cases C-570/07 and C-571/07 Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez [2010] ECR I-4629.  
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 WR  RI &2&20¶V RUGHU RI  $SULO 6, any facility for the elderly ± including 
sheltered housing and day-care and night-care centres ± is required to obtain prior approval 
from COCOM before being brought into service on the grounds that such establishments 
offer healthcare services which should be regulated. On the basis of that order COCOM 
adopted a decision on 3 December 20097 which laid down certain standards which needed to 
be satisfied before approval could be granted. Femarbel challenged the 2009 decision, 
alleging the unconstitutionality of the 2008 order as its legal basis. 6KDULQJ )HPDUEHO¶V
GRXEWVWKH&RQVHLOG¶eWDWUHIHUUHGD number of questions to the Cour constitutionnelle for a 
preliminary ruling on the compatibility of the 2008 order and the 2009 decision with articles 
10 and 11 of the Belgian Constitution ± which guarantee equality before the law and the right 
to non-discrimination ± read in conjunction with Directive 2006/123. In order to provide an 
DQVZHU IRU WKH&RQVHLOG¶eWDW WKH&RXUFRQVWLWXWLRQQHOOHVRXJKWJXLGDQFH IURPWKH ECJ on 
the scope of the Services Directive and in particular the meaning of the reference to 
µKHDOWKFDUHVHUYLFHV¶DQGµVRFLDOVHUYLFHV¶FRQWDLQHGLQDUWLFOHs 2(2)(f) and (j) of the Directive. 
In their written submissions to the ECJ, The Netherlands and the European Commission 
argued that article 2(2)(f) did not apply to day-care and night-care centres for the elderly 
provided these did not, as their principal objective, provide medical treatment. The 
Netherlands and the European Commission therefore pleaded in favour of the application of 
the Services Directive to the present case.  
 
3. Opinions and Judgments 
 
3.1 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Ottica 
The Advocate General delivered his Opinion on 30 January 2013. His starting point is the 
admissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling as the facts of the case do not contain a 
cross-border element. In invoking a presumption of relevance, the Advocate General found 
the request to be admissible as a ruling could be of use in similar situations where a national 
of another Member State may be affected. 
In his substantive analysis of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling, the Advocate 
General begins by FDWHJRULVLQJ WKH QDWXUH RI DFWLYLWLHV ZKLFK RSWLFLDQV¶ VKRSV FDUU\ RXW 
Based on the reasoning adopted in earlier case law8, he makes a distinction between those 
activities pursued by an optician which are medical in nature and those which are technical or 
µSDUDRSWLFDO¶9: only those activities of a medical nature could EHUHVWULFWHGWRRSWLFLDQV¶VKRSV
on the grounds of the protection of public health. Against this background, the Advocate 
General considers whether EU law guaranteeing the freedom of establishment precludes the 
regional legislation at issue in this case. Following a discussion of the effects of the 
                                                            
6 Order of 28 April 2008 concerning facilities receiving or accommodating the elderly Moniteur belge, 16 May 
2008, p. 25666. 
7 Moniteur belge of 17 December 2009, p. 79487. 
8 Case C-108/09 Ker-Optika [2010] ECR I-12213; Case C-271/92 LPO [1993] ECR I-2899; Case C-108/96 
MacQuen and Others [2001] ECR I-837; Case C-140/03 Commission v Greece [2005] ECR I-3177. 
9 See para 21 for an explanation. 
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legislation, the Advocate General finds that the legislDWLRQ¶VFRQGLWLRQVUHJDUGLQJSRSXODWLRQ
GHQVLW\DQGJHRJUDSKLFDOGLVWDQFH³GHVSLWH[their] ostensibly non-discriminatory nature, >«@
VHHP>«@ OLDEOH WR LQYROYH LQGLUHFWO\GLVFULPLQDWRU\HIIHFWV LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKHQDWLRQDOLW\RI
WKHEXVLQHVVHVLQYROYHG´10 As such, the legislation must be seen to constitute a restriction on 
the freedom of establishment. The justification of the protection of public health can only be 
invoked LQFDVHVZKHUHWKHUHH[LVWV³DVWURQJDSSURSULDWHOLQNEHWZHHQWKHDLPVSXUVXHGE\ 
WKHGLVSXWHGOHJLVODWLRQDQGWKHRYHUULGLQJUHDVRQUHODWLQJWRWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVWDWLVVXH´11 It 
is up to the Member State concerned to present convincing evidence of such a link. In this 
case, the Italian Government did not submit any observations. Moreover, referring back to his 
SUHOLPLQDU\ REVHUYDWLRQV RQ WKH PL[HG QDWXUH RI WKH DFWLYLWLHV RI RSWLFLDQV¶ VKRSV WKH
Advocate General required a higher threshold for justification of the restrictions in cases 
where activities ± VXFKDVWKRVHRIRSWLFLDQV¶Vhops ± were not solely aimed at the provision 
RI KHDOWKFDUH :KLOH WKH UHVWULFWLRQ EDVHG RQ SRSXODWLRQ GHQVLW\ ³PD\ EH SXUVXLQJ WKH
objective of protecting public health, in that it is intended to achieve, inter alia, the equitable 
provision of optical proGXFWV WR WKH SRSXODWLRQ DQG WKH EDODQFHG GLVWULEXWLRQ RI RSWLFLDQV¶
VKRSVWKURXJKRXW6LFLO\´12, the geographical restriction has no obvious ³FRQQHFWLRQZLWKWKH
REMHFWLYHRISURWHFWLQJSXEOLFKHDOWK´13  
Finally, the Advocate General considered the validity of the analogy that the national court 
had attempted to draw with Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez where the Court had accepted the 
need for planning of distribution of public health establishments and infrastructures. For the 
Advocate General however pharmacieV DQG RSWLFLDQV¶ VKRSV IXOILO GLIIHUHQW UROHV LQ WKH
provision of public healthcare and cannot therefore be compared. It is therefore for the 
national court to establish whether the legislation at issue adequately considers the protection 
of public health in setting down its criteria and applies these criteria in an objective, non-
GLVFULPLQDWRU\IDVKLRQ2YHUDOO WKH$GYRFDWH*HQHUDOFRQFOXGHVZLWKVHULRXVGRXEWV³DV WR
WKH DSSURSULDWHQHVV RI WKH FULWHULD JRYHUQLQJ WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI RSWLFLDQV¶ SUDFWLFHV
SURYLGHG IRU E\ 5HJLRQDO /DZ 1R ´14 DQG GHHPV ³WKH 6LFLOLDQ OHJLVODWLRQ WR EH
H[FHVVLYHLQFRQVLVWHQWDQGLQDSSURSULDWHIRUDFKLHYLQJWKHREMHFWLYHSXUVXHG´15 
 
3.2 Judgment of the Court in Ottica  
The ECJ, in its short judgment of 26 September 2013, adopts a similar approach to the 
Advocate General but differs in the conclusions that it draws. It clarifies at the outset that it 
considers the legislation at issue to amount to a restriction on the freedom of establishment as 
                                                            
10 $WSDUD7KHUDWLRQDOHIRUWKLVFRQFOXVLRQLVVHWRXWLQSDUD³$FFRUGLQJWR5HJLRQDO/DZ1o 12/2004, 
WKHOLPLWVRQWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIRSWLFLDQV¶SUDFWLFHVGRQRWDSSO\LQFDVHVRIWUDQVIHUIURPUHQWHGWRRZQHU-
occupied premises or where the practice is compelled to transfer as a result inter alia of eviction. It is highly 
probably that any such derogation operates more in favour of residents of Sicily than of people who originate 
HOVHZKHUHLQWHUDOLDQDWLRQDOVRIRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWHV´ 
11 At para 49. 
12 At para 53. 
13 At para 54. 
14 At para 80. 
15 At para 83. 
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LW³KLQGHUVDQGUHQGHUVOHVVDWWUDFWLYHWKHH[HUFLVHE\RSWLFLDQVIURPRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWHVRI
WKHLUDFWLYLWLHVLQ,WDOLDQWHUULWRU\WKURXJKDIL[HGSODFHRIEXVLQHVV´16 Such restrictions may 
be justified by the general objective of the protection of public health17 and, may include, 
measures to regulate the geographical distribution of healthcare providers18.  
Unlike the Advocate General, the ECJ accepts the transposition of the principle elaborated in 
Blanco Peréz and Chao Gómez WRRSWLFLDQV¶VKRSVDV³WKe opticians in the main proceedings 
provide services aimed at assessing, maintaining or restoring the state of health of patients, 
ZLWK WKH UHVXOW WKDW WKRVH VHUYLFHV DUH HQFRPSDVVHG E\ WKH SURWHFWLRQ RI SXEOLF KHDOWK´19 
While the ECJ recognises that some GLIIHUHQFHVPD\H[LVWEHWZHHQSKDUPDFLHVDQGRSWLFLDQV¶
shops particularly when it comes to provision of urgent medical care, this merely leads the 
ECJ to DIIRUG0HPEHU6WDWHVDPDUJLQRIGLVFUHWLRQLQRUJDQLVLQJWKHSODQQLQJRIRSWLFLDQV¶
shops in a way comparable to that applicable to pharmacies. As such, it is for the national 
court to assess whether Regional Law No 12/2004 is appropriate for ensuring attainment of 
the objective of the protection of public health. In concluding, the ECJ provides only limited 
guidance to the national court by requiring it to consider:  
using specific statistical data or other means, whether the competent authorities use 
appropriately, in accordance with transparent and objective criteria, the powers made 
available under the legislation, with a view to attaining, in a coherent and systematic 
manner, the objectives pursued relating to the protection of public health throughout 
the territory concerned.20 
The ECJ therefore follows the same approach as in Blanco Peréz and Chao Gómez by 
holding that article 49 TFEU does not preclude OHJLVODWLRQ RQ WKH UHJXODWLRQ RI RSWLFLDQV¶
shops which may constitute a restriction on the freedom of establishment SURYLGHG ³WKH
competent authorities use appropriately, in accordance with transparent and objective criteria, 
WKHSRZHUVPDGHDYDLODEOHXQGHUWKHOHJLVODWLRQFRQFHUQHG´21 
 
3.3 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Femarbel 
The Advocate General issued his Opinion in Femarbel on 14 March 2013 and begins with an 
interpretation of WKHPHDQLQJRIµKHDOWKFDUHIDFLOLWLHV¶XQGHUDUWLFOHIZLWKUHIHUHQFHWR
recital 22 in the preamble of the Services Directive22 and article 3(a) of the Patient Mobility 
                                                            
16 At para 31. 
17 Joined Cases C-171/07 and C- 172/07 Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and Others [2009] ECR I-4171 and 
Case C-169/07 Hartlauer [2009] ECR I-1721. 
18 Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez cited supra note 5. 
19 At para 37. 
20 At para 56. 
21 At para 57. 
22 5HFLWDOUHDGV³The exclusion of healthcare from the scope of this Directive should cover healthcare and 
pharmaceutical services provided by health professionals to patients to assess, maintain or restore their state of 
health where those activities are reserved to a regulated health profession in the Member State in which the 
VHUYLFHVDUHSURYLGHG´ 
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Directive23. On this basis, it is clear that healthcare services under EU law should be 
XQGHUVWRRG WR LQFOXGH WKHGLDJQRVLV WUHDWPHQW DQG LPSURYHPHQWRI DSDWLHQW¶VKHDOWK7KLV
could also be extended to encompass ancillary medical services which contribute to the care 
and treatment of patients. As such, the Advocate General closely follows the intention of the 
Patient Mobility Directive in requiring healthcare services to be provided by healthcare 
SURIHVVLRQDOVZKRKDYHDV WKHLUREMHFWLYHWRDVVHVVPDLQWDLQRUUHVWRUHDSDWLHQW¶VKHDOWKLQ
order to be excluded from the scope of the Services Directive. Activities which are closely 
related to, but do not have as their principal objective the health of a patient thus fall within 
the scope of the Services Directive. Against this background, the Advocate General does not 
consider )HPDUEHO¶V day-care centres to provide a service which has a predominantly medical 
objective.24 In the case of night-care centres however the Advocate General leaves it up to the 
referring court to establish the medical nature of the centres and to determine on that basis 
whether they fall within the healthcare exception contained in article 2(2)(f) of the Services 
Directive.25 
,QDVHFRQGVHFWLRQRIKLV2SLQLRQWKH$GYRFDWH*HQHUDOFRQVLGHUVZKHWKHU)HPDUEHO¶VGD\-
care and night-care centres can be considered social services within the meaning of article 
2(2)(j) of the Services Directive and should therefore be excluded from the scope of the 
Directive. ,QGLVFXVVLQJ WKHPHDQLQJRI µVRFLDO VHUYLFHV¶XQGHU WKH'LUHFWLYH, the Advocate 
General draws a distinction between services which have a commercial and a non-
commercial purpose; the latter being expressly excluded from the scope of the Directive by 
article 2(2)(a)26. Any additional exceptions such as that UHODWLQJWRµVRFLDOVHUYLFHV¶LQDUWLFOH
2(2)(j) must therefore refer to services which have a commercial purpose but which may 
nonetheless be excluded from the scope of the Directive as they manifest the principles of 
social cohesion and solidarity, and preserve the fundamental right to human dignity and 
integrity. In order to benefit from the exception in article 2(2)(j) such services must be 
³SURYLGHGE\WKH6WDWHE\SURYLGHUVPDQGDWHGE\WKH6WDWHRUE\FKDULWLHVUHFRJQLVHGDVVXFK
E\ WKH 6WDWH´ 0HPEHU 6WDWHV KDYH EURDG GLVFUHWLRQ LQ GHFLGLQJ KRZ WR µPDQGDWH¶ Vervice 
providers for the purposes of the Services Directive. However, the Advocate General 
VXJJHVWVWKDWDµPDQGDWH¶LQWKHFRQWH[WRIVRFLDOVHUYLFHVFDQRQO\EHUHFRJQLVHGXQGHU(8
law if the State transfers ± based in law ± the provision of a public service available to all 
those in need of the service to a private service provider.27 As such, the obligation under such 
D µPDQGDWH¶ PXVW JR EH\RQG WKH UHDOP RI D VWDQGDUG FRPPHUFLDO FRQWUDFW $SSO\LQJ WKHVH
criteria to the case at hand, the Advocate General finds that the services provided by 
Femarbel do not entail the provision of a public service as they are of a purely commercial 
nature and are not mandated by the State. As such, the day-care and night-care centres do not 
IDOO XQGHU WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI µVRFLDO VHUYLFHV¶ FRQWDLQHG LQ DUWLFOH M RI WKH 6HUYLFHV
Directive. 
                                                            
23 $UWDGHILQHVµKHDOWKFDUH¶DV³health services provided by health professionals to patients to assess, 
maintain or restore their state of health, including the prescription, dispensation and provision of medicinal 
SURGXFWVDQGPHGLFDOGHYLFHV´ 
24 At para 30. 
25 At para 36. 
26 Art. DRIWKH6HUYLFHV'LUHFWLYHH[FOXGHV³QRQ-HFRQRPLFVHUYLFHVRIJHQHUDOLQWHUHVW´ 
27 At paras. 49-50. 
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3.4 Judgment of the Court in Femarbel 
The ECJ, in a very short judgment issued on 11 July 2013, adopts a similar approach to that 
of the Advocate General. While it does noWFLWHWKH$GYRFDWH*HQHUDO¶V2SLQLRQLWVMXGJPHQW
reflects the more detailed arguments put forward by the Advocate General. The ECJ explores 
at the outset WKH FRQVWLWXHQW HOHPHQWV RI WKH FRQFHSWV µKHDOWKFDUH VHUYLFHV¶ DQG µVRFLDO
VHUYLFHV¶ µ+HDOWKFDUHVHUYLFHV¶DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH&RXUW³cover activities directly and strictly 
linked to the state of human health and therefore do not concern services which are designed 
to enhance well-EHLQJRUSURYLGHUHOD[DWLRQVXFKDVVSRUWVRUILWQHVVFOXEV´28 Authority for 
this definition can be found in the Patient Mobility Directive. On the basis of this very limited 
JXLGDQFH LW LV OHIW XS WR WKH QDWLRQDO FRXUW WR GHWHUPLQH ZKHWKHU )HPDUEHO¶V GD\-care and 
night-care centres fall within or outside the scope of the Services Directive. The ECJ, unlike 
the Advocate General, does not comment on the nature of the services provided by Femarbel. 
The ECJ¶V GLVFXVVLRQ RI WKH FRQFHSW RI µVRFLDO VHUYLFHV¶ LV VRPHZKDW PRUHGHWDLOHGEXW LQ
effect also gives the national court a wide margin of discretion in deciding whether 
)HPDUEHO¶V DFWLYLWLHV VKRXOG EH FDXJKW E\ WKH 6HUYLFHV 'LUHFWLYH $FFRUGLQJ WR WKH ECJ, 
µVRFLDOVHUYLFHV¶RQO\FRPHZLWKLQWKHVFRSHRIDUWLFOHMRIWKH6HUYLFHV'LUHFWLYHLIWKH\
meet two cumulative conditions which have their origin in the article itself read in 
conjunction with recital 27 in the preamble of the Directive: first, such services must be 
³DFWLYLWLHVZKLFKDUHHVVHQWLDO LQRUGHU WRJXDUDQWHHWKHIXQGDPHQWDOULJKW WRKXPDQGLJQLW\
and integrity anG DUH DPDQLIHVWDWLRQ RI WKHSULQFLSOHVRI VRFLDO FRKHVLRQ DQG VROLGDULW\´29; 
and, second, WKH\PXVWEHSURYLGHGE\³WKH6WDWHLWVHOIDFKDULW\UHFRJQLVHGDVVXFKE\WKH
6WDWHRUDSULYDWHVHUYLFHSURYLGHUPDQGDWHGE\WKH6WDWH´30 A private service provider is to 
EH FRQVLGHUHG DV KDYLQJ EHHQ µPDQGDWHG E\ WKH 6WDWH¶ LI LW KDV D ELQGLQJ FRPPLWPHQW WR
SURYLGHWKHVHUYLFHVLQTXHVWLRQDQGGRHVVRLQDFFRUGDQFH³ZLWKWKHHVWDEOLVKHGTXDQWLWDWLYH
and qualitative requirements and in such a manner as to ensure the equality of access to 
VHUYLFHV´31 The commitment to provide a service PXVWEHHQVXUHGWKURXJK³DQDFWFRQIHUULQJ
to a private service provider, in a clear and transparent manner, the social services obligation 
with which it is chaUJHG´32 On this basis, the ECJ again leaves it up to the national court to 
GHWHUPLQHZKHWKHU)HPDUEHO¶VGD\-care and night-FDUHFHQWUHVVKRXOGEHFODVVLILHGDVµVRFLDO
VHUYLFHV¶ ZLWKLQ WKH PHDQLQJ RI WKH 6HUYLFHV 'LUHFWLYH ,Q WKH ILQDO WZR SDUDJUDSKV RI Lts 
judgment the ECJ FODULILHV WKDW WKH QDWLRQDO FRXUW PXVW GHFLGH ZKHWKHU WKH FDUH FHQWUHV¶
DFWLYLWLHV DUH RI D ³JHQXLQHO\ VRFLDO QDWXUH´33 DQG ZKHWKHU &2&20¶V RUGHU FRXOG EH
considered a mandating act according to the criteria laid out by the ECJ. 
 
                                                            
28 At para 37. 
29 At para 43. 
30 At para 44. 
31 At para 47 and see Case C-140/09 Fallimento Traghetti del Mediterraneo [2010] ECR I-5243. 
32 At para 48 and by analogy see Fallimento Traghetti del Mediterraneo cited supra note 31. 
33 At para 51. 
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4. Comment 
Neither of the ECJ¶VMXGJPHQWVLQOttica New Line or Femarbel is particularly controversial 
nor indeed lengthy. The facts of the cases illustrate that despite limited EU competence in the 
field of healthcare, practically any aspect of healthcare regulation can be challenged using the 
free movement rules.34 As Gekiere et al. point out: 
Regulation in the field of health care is being scrutinized with regard to its conformity 
with EU law, particularly Community rules on free movement. As different forms of 
mobility in the EU increase and also extend to all sectors, including health care, national 
measures and mechanisms increasingly run the risk of being seen as unjustified obstacles 
to free movement, which is prohibited under the EC Treaty.35 
However, in its judgments WKH&RXUWFOHDUO\³UHFRJQLVHG0HPEHU6WDWHV¶VRYHUHLJQSRZHUVWR
organise their social security systems in the absence of harmonisation at EU level, as long as 
WKHVH SRZHUV DUH H[HUFLVHG LQ FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK (8 ODZ´36 The ECJ therefore refused to 
uphold the challenge of private commercial interest groups who were seeking to increase 
their ability to provide healthcare services in an increasingly lucrative market. In the context 
of the free movement of services and establishment, this is somewhat surprising as the ECJ 
has progressively widened the scope of articles 49 and 56 TFEU over the last few years37 and 
had the opportunity to do the same especially with the Services Directive in these cases. In its 
reasoning, however the ECJ seemed to recognise the need for government regulatory 
intervention in order to correct market imbalances in the provision of healthcare. The 
GHFLVLRQV WKHUHIRUH VWDQG LQ FRQWUDVW WR WKH (8¶V SULRULWLHV LQ UHFHQW \HDUV One can only 
speculate about possible explanations bHKLQGWKH&RXUW¶VDSSURDFKThe non-economic nature 
of the particular services at issue may have been one contributing factor in this regard.38 
Furthermore, the public interest justification seemed to outweigh economic considerations in 
both cases. For national governments, the judgments in both cases should be welcomed as 
confirming their discretion in the regulation of ancillary medical services provided any 
restrictions are adequately justified. As such, the judgments seem to be in line with the EU 
KHDOWK PLQLVWHUV¶ FRPPRQ VWDWHPHQW LVVXHG LQ -XQH  ZKLFK VRXJKW WR HQVXUH WKDW (8
integration should not have a negative effect on the basic objectives of national healthcare 
                                                            
34 *'DYLHVµ7KHSURFHVVDQGVLGH-HIIHFWVRIKDUPRQLVDWLRQRI(XURSHDQZHOIDUHVWDWHV¶-HDQ0RQQHW:RUNLQJ
Paper 02/06 [2006]. 
35 W. Gekiere, R. Baeten and :3DOP³)UHHPRYHPHQWRIVHUYLFHVLQWKH(8DQGKHDOWKFDUH´LQ(0RVVLDORV
et al. (eds), Health Szstems Governance in Europe: The Role of European Union Law and Policy, (CUP, 2010), 
p. 461)RUDQRYHUYLHZRIWKH(8¶VDFWLYLWLHVLQWKHILHOGRIKHDOWKFDUHVHH7+HUYH\DQG%9DQKHUFNH
³+HDOWKFDUHDQGWKH(8WKHODZDQGSROLF\SDWFKZRUN´LQ(0RVVLDlos et al. (eds), Health Systems Governance 
in Europe: The Role of European Union Law and Policy, (CUP, 2010), ch. 2. 
36 Gekiere, Baeten and Palm, op. cit supra note 35 at 477. 
37 Gekiere, Baeten and Palm, op. cit supra note 35 provides DFRPSUHKHQVLYHRYHUYLHZRIWKH(&-¶VFDVHODZLQ
these fields in recent years. 
38 7KHVDPHDUJXPHQWVHHPHGWRXQGHUSLQWKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJLQ&DVH&-70/95 Sodemare [1997] ECR I-3395 
EXWKDVEHHQUHMHFWHGLQPRUHUHFHQWMXGJPHQWVVHH9+DW]RSRXORVµ.Llling national health and insurance 
systems but healing patients? The European market for health care services after the judements of the ECJ in 
Vanbraekel and Peerbooms¶&0/5HY-729. 
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systems.39 Nonetheless, both cases raise a number of specific issues which are discussed in 
the following sections. A final section assesses the implications of the absence of a cross-
border element from the facts of both cases; an aspect which reveals some interrelated and 
potential long-term difficulties. 
 
4.1 The judgment in Ottica New Line 
7KH&RXUW¶V conclusion in Ottica New Line that the Italian law regulating the distribution of 
RSWLFLDQV¶ VKRSV amounts to a breach of article 49 TFEU LV EDODQFHG ZLWK WKH &RXUW¶V 
acceptance of the public health care justification put forward in Blanco Peréz and Chao 
Gómez which affords Member States a wide margin of discretion in the regulation of 
ancillary healthcare providers. As such, the Court is merely confirming its earlier case law on 
the non-interference with regulations adopted by Member States in the field of public health 
and, in particular, concerning access of the population to healthcare.40 Moreover, the decision 
in Ottica New Line FRQILUPV WKH &RXUW¶V DSSURDFK LQ Ker-Optika41 ZKHUH RSWLFLDQV¶ VKRSV
were recognised as appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective of ensuring the 
protection of public health. Even though the ECJ, in Ottica New Line, recognises that 
RSWLFLDQV¶VKRSVGRQRWSURYLGHDVHVVHQWLDODVHUYLFHDVSKDUPDFLHVRURWKHUPHGLFDOVHUYLFH
providers42, the CouUW ³QRWHV WKDW LW LV IRU WKH 0HPEHU 6WDWHV WR GHFLGH RQ WKH GHJUHH RI
protection which they wish to afford to public health and on the way in which that protection 
LV WR EH DFKLHYHG´43 As such, the ECJ has left Member States with a wide margin of 
discretion in the regulation and definition of public health services in their territories.  
The ECJ¶V MXGJPHQW LQ WKLV UHJDUG VWDQGV LQ VWDUN FRQWUDVW WR WKH2SLQLRQRI WKH$GYRFDWH
General which provided convincing arguments DV WR ZK\ RSWLFLDQV¶ VKRSV GLIIHU IURP
pharmacies. Following his reasoning on the urgent medical nature of the services provided by 
RSWLFLDQV¶VKRSVDQGSKDUPDFLHVLWLVFOHDUWKDWWKHSULQFLSOHVODLGGRZQLQBlanco Pérez and 
Chao Gómez cannot simply be transposed to the case at hand. The right to regulate which the 
ECJ accepted in Ottica New Line UHPDLQVDQHJDWLYHUDWKHUWKDQDSRVLWLYHULJKWRSWLFLDQV¶
shops can be restricted in their freedom of establishment on the grounds of public health 
through the requirement for prior authorisation for the HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI DQ RSWLFLDQV¶ shop 
where: 
[P]lanning proves indispensable for filling in possible gaps in access to public health 
services and for avoiding the duplication of structures, so as to ensure the provision of 
public health care which is adapted to the needs of the population, which covers the 
                                                            
39 &RXQFLORIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQµ&RXQFLO&RQFOXVLRQVRQ common values and principles in EU health 
V\VWHPV¶rd Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council Meeting, Luxembourg, 1-2 
June 2006.   
40 See also Apothekerkammer and Hartlauer cited supra note 17 and Case C-141/07 Commission v Germany 
[2008] ECR I-6935. 
41 Ker-Optika cited supra note 8. 
42 See, for example, Hartlauer cited supra note 17 where the same reasoning was applied to dental clinics which 
provided ancillary dental services. 
43 Para 44. 
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entire territory and which takes account of geographically isolated or otherwise 
disadvantaged regions.44 
The Italian Regional Law at issue however merely restriFWV WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI RSWLFLDQV¶
shops in particular areas but does not encourage their establishment in isolated or otherwise 
disadvantaged regions. As such, the law must be distinguished from that at issue in Blanco 
Pérez and Chao Gómez where the relevant law on the regulation of pharmacies granted an 
advantage in future tendering competitions to those pharmacies which had previously been 
established in disadvantaged or isolated areas.45 Such an incentive was accepted by the Court 
as appropriate for achLHYLQJ WKH ODZ¶V SXEOLF KHDOWK REMHFWLYHV 7KH ,WDOLDQ 5HJLRQDO /DZ
does not contain an equivalent incentive. This is clearly recognised by the Court when it 
DOOXGHVWRWKHIDFWWKDW³5HJLRQDO/DZ1RULVNVIDLOLQJWRHQVXUHDQHYHQGLVWULEXWLRQ
of RSWLFLDQV¶ VKRSV WKURXJKRXW WKH HQWLUH WHUULWRU\ DQG FRnsequently, an equal level of 
protection of public health throughout that territor\´ 7KH MXVWLILFDWLRQ ZKLFK WKH &RXUW
accepts is thus much more tenuous than in its previous case law and should have led the 
&RXUW WR HQWHUWDLQ WKH VDPH ³VHULRXV GRXEWV´46 as the Advocate General on the 
appropriateness of the law in question. 1RQHWKHOHVVWKH&RXUWOHDYHVLWWRWKHQDWLRQDOFRXUWV¶
discretion to adjudicate on the appropriateness of the law. The judgment stands in stark 
contrast to that in Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez where the ECJ discussed at length the 
requirements of the Spanish law in question and its appropriateness in terms of its 
proportionality to the aims it sought to achieve. It is unsatisfactory that the Court in Ottica 
New Line did not engage in a similar analysis of the Italian law which ± in its requirements ± 
is far less detailed than the Spanish law. As such, it seems that Member States have a very 
wide margin of discretion in the regulation of ancillary healthcare providers in their territory. 
 
4.2 The judgment in Femarbel 
 
Femarbel marks the ECJ¶V ILUVW MXGJPHQW RQ the substantive provisions of the Services 
Directive and, as such, merits close scrutiny.47 However, the definition given by the Court to 
articles 2(2)(f) and (j) upholds the distinction between the Services Directive and the Patient 
Mobility Directive and only provides very limited guidance particularly on the nature of 
healthcare but also social services as understood by the Services Directive. While the Court 
discusses the definition of social services in some detail and, in doing so, reflects the views of 
the Advocate General, much of that discussion restricts itself to procedural considerations in 
discussing the type of mandate given to a social service provider rather than the nature of the 
services as such. The importance that the ECJ attaches to the nature of the mandate granted 
effectively limits the scope of the Services Directive to commercial social service providers. 
                                                            
44 Para 36 by analogy to Blanco Perez cited supra note 5 at para 70. 
45 See paras 77-78 and 87. 
46 Para 80. 
47 Although the Services Directive was at issue in Joined Cases C-357-359/10 Duomo Gpa SRL v Gestioni 
Servizi Pubblici, judgment of 10 May 2012, nyr, the Court did not give any interpretation of the relevant 
articles.  
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,QGRLQJVRWKH(&-XSKROGVWKH³FOHDUSROLWLFDOGHFLVLRQ>XQGHUO\LQJWKH6HUYLFHV'LUHFWLYH@
to draw a line between what belongs to the state (criminal law, labour law, healthcare and so 
on) from what belongs to the Community (not much if the Directive is to be taken 
OLWHUDOO\´48 However, as the provision of social services in EU Member States is 
increasingly sub-contracted to private organisations, such services (even if they appear to be 
provided by the state) ± following the ECJ¶V MXGJPHQW LQ Femarbel ± would be subject to 
internal market rules under the Services Directive if the mandate transferring the services 
GRHVQRWIXOILOWKH&RXUW¶VFULWHULD 
Given the complexities of the implementation process of the Services Directive across the 
Member States49, a more detailed analysis of its scope in relation to the definition of 
healthcare would also have been welcome. It seems clear however that the Court did not want 
WRXSVHWWKHEDODQFHHVWDEOLVKHGE\WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQOHJLVODWXUHEHWZHHQ³RQWKHRQHKDQG
the objective of eliminating obstacles to freedom of establishment of service providers and 
the free movement of services, and, on the other hand, the need to safeguard the specific 
characteristics of certain sensitive activities, in particular those linked to the protection of 
human healtK´50 It is ultimately left to the national court to decide whether a particular 
service falls within or outwith the Services Directive depending on the type of activities 
which that service provides within the national healthcare system. Member States are thus left 
with a wide margin of discretion. It is regrettable that the ECJ did not engage more with the 
Advocate General who, in his Opinion, presented guidance51 on the interpretation of 
µKHDOWKFDUH¶XQGHUthe Services Directive.  
The AdvRFDWH *HQHUDO¶V DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI KHDOWKFDUH VHUYLFHV WR )HPDUEHO¶V
day-care and night-care centres gives some indication of the extent to which medical 
professionals need to be involved in the provision of a service in order for it to fall outwith 
WKHVFRSHRIWKH6HUYLFHV'LUHFWLYH$VVXFKWKH$GYRFDWH*HQHUDO¶VFRQFOXVLRQVUHIOHFW the 
economic reality of the services provided (by including day-care centres within the Services 
Directive) and his analysis creates greater legal certainty as to the scope of the Directive in 
the field of healthcare. By way of contrast, the ECJ¶VFRQFOXVLRQVDUHUDWKHUYDJXHDQGODFN
detailed reasoning. :KLOHWKHMXGJPHQWVWULNHV³DEDODQFHEHWZHHQIUHHPRYHPHQWRQWKHRQH
hand, and the protection of public LQWHUHVWREMHFWLYHVRQWKHRWKHU´52 it fails to provide legal 
certainty. The judgment thus raises questions about the future regulation of healthcare 
services within the EU. The support given by the European Commission and the Dutch 
government to the inclXVLRQ RI )HPDUEHO¶V DFWLYLWLHV ZLWKLQ WKH VFRSH RI WKH 'LUHFWLYH
LOOXVWUDWHV WKH LQFUHDVHG HPSKDVLV SXW DW DQ (8 OHYHO ³RQ WKH HFRQRPLF GLPHQVLRQ RI WKH
KHDOWKVHFWRUDQGLWVSRWHQWLDOIRUERRVWLQJWKH/LVERQDJHQGD´53. At the same time, it seems 
                                                            
48 $%LRQGL³5HFXUULQJ&\FOHVLQWKH,QWHUQDO0DUNHW6RPH5HIOHFWLRQVRQWKH)UHH0RYHPHQWRI6HUYLFHV´LQ
A. Arnull et al., Continuity and Change in EU law (OUP, 2008), p. 235. 
49 See Hatzopoulos, op. cit. supra note 1 at 461-3 for an overview. 
50 A. Baeyens and T. Goffin, ³ECJ 2013/XX, Fédération des maisons de repos privées de Belgique (Femarbel) 
ASBL v. Commission communautaire commune de Bruxelles-Capitale, 11 July 2013 (C-´ (2013) 20 
European Journal of Health Law 499 at 502. 
51 See paras 21-27 of the Opinion. 
52 Gekiere, Baeten and Pal, op. cit supra note 35 at 495. 
53 Ibid, p. 462.  
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clear that any services which include an element of human health are excluded from the 
ambit of the Services Directive and are therefore limited in their exposure to the internal 
market.  
 
4.3 The abolition of the cross-border element 
Both Femarbel and Ottica New Line are notable for the absence of a cross-border element 
from the facts of the cases. As such, the cases enshrine the ECJ¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRUXOHRQWKH
compatibility of national laws with EU law in cases where there is no cross-border element 
which would normally justify the application of EU law. While Advocate General Jääskinen 
discusses the admissibility of Ottica New Line in his Opinion, the issue was not considered by 
the ECJ in either of its judgments.  
It is clear from the wording of article 49 TFEU and from settled case law of the Court that the 
provisions of the Treaty on the freedom of establishment do not apply to wholly internal 
situations ZKHUHWKHUH LVQR³FURVV-ERUGHUHOHPHQW´DQGWKHUHIRUHQR³FRQQHFWLQJIDFWRU´RU
³FRQQHFWLQJ OLQN´ ZLWK ³WKH VLWXDWLRQV HQYLVDJHG E\ &RPPXQLW\ ODZ´.54  Similar case law 
jurisprudence exists in relation to the Treaty provisions on the free movement of services.55 
As a result, a party in national proceedings may only invoke the specific freedom where the 
factual circumstances of the case fall within the scope of that freedom; in relation to both the 
freedom of establishment and the free movement of services a cross-border element 
constitutes one such fact.56 This has JLYHQ ULVH WR FODLPV RI µUHYHUVH GLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶57 
whereby nationals of a state find themselves at a disadvantage in comparison to EU nationals 
residing in the same Member State. ,WKDVEHHQDUJXHGWKDWUHYHUVHGLVFULPLQDWLRQLV³DE\-
SURGXFW RI WKH GLYLVLRQ RI FRPSHWHQFHV EHWZHHQ QDWLRQDO ODZ DQG (& ODZ´58 It occurs 
³EHFDXVH(&ODZREOLJHV6WDWHVWRWUHDWQDWLRnals of other Member States in a way which ± by 
reasons of their own policies and aims ± they did not originally intend to treat their own 
QDWLRQDOV´59 In recent case law on the freedom of establishment, the ECJ had therefore 
decided to adjudicate on wholly internal matters where it considers its answer to be useful to 
the referring court where a national law grants the same rights to nationals as those which a 
                                                            
54 For the freedom of establishment see, inter alia, Case 115/78 Knoors [1979] ECR 399; Case 204/87 Bekaert 
[1988] ECR 2029; Joined Cases C-54/88, C-91/88 amd C-14/89 Nino and Others [1990] ECR I-3537; Case C-
134/94 Esso Española  [1995] ECR I-4223; Case C-389/05 Commission v France  [2008] ECR I-5397: and, 
Case C-84/11 Susisalo and Others [2012] ECR I-0000.  
55 See Knoors cited supra note 54; Case 52/79 Debauve [1980] ECR 833; and, Case C-70/95 Sodemare [1997] 
ECR I-3395.  
56 This is evident from, for example, the wording of article 49 TFEU which prohibits restrictions on the freedom 
of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State thus requiring a 
requisite degree of movement across borders. 
57 6HH(&DQQL]]DUR³3URGXFLQJµ5HYHUVH'LVFULPLQDWLRQ¶ throXJKWKH([HUFLVHRI&RPSHWHQFHV´ (1997) 17 
YBEL 29 and C. RLWWHU³Purely Internal Situations, Reverse Discrimination, *XLPRQW']RG]LDQG$UWLFOH´ 
(2006) 31 ELRev. 690. 
58 Ritter, op. cit supra note 57 at 690. 
59 00DGXUR³The Scope of European Remedies: The Case of Purely Internal Situations and Reverse 
'LVFULPLQDWLRQ´LQ&.LOSDWULFN71RYitz and P. Skidmore, The Future of European Remedies, (Hart, 2000), 
p. 127. 
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national of another Member State in the same situation would derive from EU law.60 Thus, 
the ECJ will rule on purely internal situations where a national law prohibits reverse 
discrimination. Ritter explains the practical effect of the ECJ¶V DSSURDFK LQ WKH IROORZLQJ
terms: 
If the national law prohibits reverse discrimination, then the national judge will find 
the preliminary ruling very useful, because the ruling will set out the rights derived 
from EC law in cross-ERUGHU VLWXDWLRQV DQG WKHVH ULJKWV ZLOO WKHQ EH DSSOLHG µE\
ricocheW¶ WR WKH SXUHO\ LQWHUQDO VLWXDWLRQ VLQFH QDWLRQDO ODZ SUohibits reverse 
discrimination). In other words, the rights at issue in the purely internal situation 
depend on an interpretation of Community law.61 
In none of its rulings applying this approach does the ECJ check whether the national law 
does indeed prohibit reverse discrimination nor does it oblige the national court to either 
demonstrate that a national law addresses the question of reverse discrimination or to explain 
ZK\ WKH (&-¶V DQVZHU PD\ EH relevant for the national proceedings. It has therefore been 
questioned whether the ECJ LV XVLQJ WKH SUHOLPLQDU\ UHIHUHQFH SURFHGXUH ³DV D EDFN GRRU
mechanism to extend the benefit of EC law to all citizens ± regardless of whether they are in 
RQHRIWKHVLWXDWLRQVHQYLVDJHGE\&RPPXQLW\ODZ´62.  
It is undoubtedly true that the ECJ¶VDSSURDFKWRSXUHO\LQWHUQDOVLWXDWLRQVLQLWVUHFHQWFDVH
law encroaches upon Member State autonomy and undermines the subsidiarity principle 
inherent in EurRSHDQ ODZ ZKHUHE\ ³WKH &RPPXQLW\ OHJLVODWXUH VKRXOG RQO\ LQWHUYHQH E\
OD\LQJGRZQFHQWUDOL]HGUXOHV´63 where regulatory pluralism is ineffective. Proponents of the 
abolition of the wholly internal rule point out the inconsistencies between an ever closer 
Union of 28 Member States and the limited applicability of EU law to those citizens who are 
ZLOOLQJWRPRYHE\DUJXLQJWKDW³DLPLQJDWDQLQWHUQDOPDUNHWRUFRPSOHWLQJLWZKLOHDWWKH
same time continuing to attach importance to the crossing of national frontiers is self-
FRQWUDGLFWRU\´64 6LPLODUO\LWKDVEHHQVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKHZKROO\LQWHUQDOUXOHSRVHV³DYHU\
real danger of inconsistency of effect and, in turn, retained inconsistency of opportunities for 
(8FLWL]HQVZKRGRQ¶WPRYHDQ\ZKHUH´65 $WWKHVDPHWLPH³LWPDNHVVHQVHIRUWKH0HPEHU
States to retain competence over their purely internal sphere ± if only because they may wish 
to regulate their respective societies on the basis of policy goals other than the narrow list of 
public order oEMHFWLYHVVHWRXWLQWKH7UHDW\´66 The ECJ¶VGHFLVLRQVLQFemarbel and Ottica 
New Line are particularly troubling in this regard. Unlike in previous cases where the Court 
                                                            
60 See Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez cited supra note 5 at para 39; Case C-451/03 Servizi Ausiliari Dottori 
Commercialisti [2006] ECR I-2941 at para 29, and Joined Cases C-94/04 and C-202/04 Cipolla and Others 
[2006] ECR I-11421 at para 30. 
61 Ritter, op. cit supra note 57 at 697.  
62 Ibid at 694. 
63 A. Tryfonidou, Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, (Kluwer Law International, 2009), p. 9. 
64 Maduro, op. cit supra note 59 at 126, referring to J. '¶2OLYHLUD³,V 
UHYHUVHGLVFULPLQDWLRQVWLOOSRVVLEOHXQGHUWKH6LQJOH(XURSHDQ$FW"´LQForty Years On: The 
Evolution of Postwar Private International Law in Europe (Kluwer, 1990), p. 84. 
65 11LF6KXLEQH³Free movement of persons and the wholly LQWHUQDOUXOH7LPHWRPRYHRQ"´ 39 CML Rev. 
(2002), 731-771 at 770. 
66 Ritter, op. cit supra note 57 at 701. 
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has adjudicated on purely internal situations, this time the ECJ did not even discuss 
admissibility of the cases and proceeded directly to a discussion of the substantive (EU) laws 
applicable in each case. $VVXFKWKHFDVHVLQGLFDWHWKH&RXUW¶VDFFHSWDQFHRILWVDSSURDFKWR
wholly internal situations as the norm. The danger of such an approach is not only the 
creeping abolition of Member State regulatory autonomy over their internal affairs; the Court 
will also, if it continues along this path, become the ultimate arbiter of policy choices across 
the EU leading potentially to the harmonisaWLRQ RI OHJLVODWLRQ LQ DUHDV RXWZLWK WKH (8¶V
competence. As Hatzopoulos points out: 
Once the Court has delivered its preliminary ruling, and given that this is fully 
binding upon the referring court, the most likely scenario is that the latter is going to 
apply to interpretation given to it, as it would ruin its credibility to hold that, after all, 
WKLV ZDV D SXUHO\ LQWHUQDO VLWXDWLRQ ,Q WKLV LQGLUHFW DQG ³SURFHGXUDO´ PDQQHU WKH
application of EU law is often extended to cover situations which would appear to be 
purely internal.67 
Moreover, following the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR)68, 
disregard for the wholly internal rule also opens up the possibility of control of national 
measures by the ECJ on the basis of article 51 CFR.69 According to the Explanations to the 
CFR70, Member States are bound by the Charter whenever fulfilling an obligation imposed by 
EU law. Conversely, where EU law does not come into play (such as in the case of wholly 
internal situations), the Charter does not apply. A creeping abolition of the wholly internal 
rule WKURXJKWKH(&-¶VFDVHODZwould render the safeguards contained in Title VII CFR and 
article 6 (1) TEU71 meaningless and would allow the ECJ to rule on the compatibility of 
national measures with those rights contained in the Charter. Such a development would in 
HIIHFWOHDGWR³DFRPSHWHQFHFUHHSYLDMXGLFLDODFWLYLVP´72 which Title VII CFR was intended 
to avoid. A first attempt to use the CFR in order to review Member State rules on shop 
trading hours was made by a private enterprise in Case C-483/12 Pelckmans73: the ECJ was 
                                                            
67 Hatzopoulos, op. cit supra note 1 at 472. 
68 Art. 6(1) TEU gives the Charter the same legal value as the Treaties. 
69 Art. 51 provides that: ³The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they 
are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the 
application thereof in accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the 
8QLRQDVFRQIHUUHGRQLWLQWKH7UHDWLHV´ 
70 See the explanations to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ [2007] C 303/17 and article 6(1) TEU which 
UHTXLUHVWKDW³7he rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with the 
general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation and application and with due regard to 
the explanations referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those SURYLVLRQV´6HHDOVR./HQDHUWV
µ([SORULQJWKH/LPLWVRIWKH(8&KDUWHURI)XQGDPHQWDO5LJKWV¶, (2012) European Constitutional Law Review, 
375-403. 
71 Title VII of the Charter (Art. 51-VSHFLILHVWKHOLPLWVRIWKH&KDUWHU¶s application. Art. 6(1) TEU provides 
WKDW³The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the 
7UHDWLHV´ 
72 Lenaerts, op. cit supra note 70 at 376. 
73 Case C-483/12 Pelckmans Turnhout NV v. Walter Van Gastel, Judgment of the Court of Justice (First 
Chamber) of 8 May 2014, nyr. For an analysis see T. Horsley, (8ODZ6XQGD\WUDGLQJUHVWULFWLRQV«DQGWKH
Charter, European Law Blog, 19 May 2014 available at http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=2372 (last visited 21 July 
2014). 
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asked to rule on the compatibility of a Belgian law restricting daily shop opening hours with 
the principles of equality and non-discrimination contained in articles 20 and 21 CFR, and 
with the relevant provisions on the free movement of goods and services. Unlike in Ottica 
New Line and Femarbel, the ECJ in Pelckmans refused jurisdiction to interpret the provisions 
of EU law at issue on the basis that the facts in the case did not come within the scope of EU 
law. A similar attempt at limiting the effects of its judgments can nonetheless be observed in 
Ottica New Line and Femarbel: the decision to grant Member States such a wide margin of 
discretion in the regulation of healthcare services within their territory restricts the potential 
impact of the judgments.   
 
5. Conclusion 
The facts of Ottica New Line and Femarbel illustrate how private healthcare providers could 
XVH³LQWHUQDOPDUNHWUXOHV>«@DVDXVHIXO>WRRO@WRFULWLFL]HWKHULJLGLW\RIKHDOWKFDUHV\VWHPV
and to argue in favour of market-oriented reforms, enhancing free choice and opening of new 
PDUNHWV´74 In both cases, private healthcare providers were unsuccessful in their attempt to 
increase the flexibility of the healthcare market; the judgments in effect blocked any attempt 
to upset the delicate balance between free movement rules and public interest considerations. 
The wide margin of discretion given to Member States in the regulation of their national 
healthcare systems upholds the view that EU integration should not undermine the values and 
principles that underpin European national healthcare systems.75 The cases nonetheless have 
important implications with regard to the ECJ¶VZLOOLQJQHVV to hand down a decision despite 
the absence of a cross-border element and raise important questions for the future limits of 
EU law.  
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